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ELIZABETH GRANT*
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") prohibits bribing 'foreign
officials," but it does not define the word 'foreign" or give any guidance
to what citizenship the official must have to fall under the FCPA. Adding
to the difficulty when defining 'foreign, " the recent rise in prosecutions
and increased FCPA case law has failed to produce an obvious answer as
to how a court should address these issues. This makes it harder for
businesses to comply with the FCPA or, in the alternative, obtain favorable
deferred prosecution agreements. This Comment argues that, while the
FCPA excludes those with U.S. citizenship from being 'foreign officials"
to protect defendants from an ambiguous criminal statute, businesses
should structure compliance programs to treat 'foreign officials" as
including those with U.S. citizenship. Section I of this Comment traces the
evolution of the United States' anti-bribery obligations. Section H1 analyzes
courts' divergent readings of the FCPA and the problem this creates for
interpreting whether 'foreign" implies that the actor must be a non-U.S.
citizen to constitute a 'foreign official." Section III identifies how a court
would use past approaches to interpret the term 'foreign" to include
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actors with U.S. citizenship, but ultimately would adopt a defendant's
narrow definition under the rule of lenity. It then argues that businesses
should consider this loophole nonexistent for compliance program
purposes. The Conclusion places this issue within the current debate over
narrowing the FCPA's terms, determining that it shows the need for
statutory clarification and reform to better allow businesses to comply with
the law.
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INTRODUCTION
On paper, the United States criminalizes bribing "foreign officials,"' but
despite clear evidence, some instances of bribery have escaped
prosecution.2 In June 2012, R. Allen Stanford stood trial for running an
investment fraud scheme.3 At trial, a witness recounted that Stanford
bribed an Antiguan bank regulator, Leroy King, as part of his actions to
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Richard L. Cassin, Stanford's Antigua Bribes: Why No FCPA
Charges, THE FCPA BLOG (June 15, 2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/6/15
/stanfords-antigua-bribes-why-no-fcpa-charges.html (noting that the government did
not pursue FCPA charges against Allen Stanford though there was clear testimony of
bribery at his trial).
3. See id. (explaining that Stanford stood trial for charges of fraud and conspiracy
for fake certificates of deposit sold to investors); see also Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Allen Stanford Sentenced to 110 Years in Prison for Orchestrating S7 Billion
Investment Fraud Scheme (June 14, 2012) available at,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-756.html.
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support the Ponzi scheme.4 Although King may have qualified under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") as a "foreign official" because he
was an instrumentality of another state, U.S. officials chose not to charge
Stanford with a FCPA violation.5 Richard Cassin, a FCPA expert, inferred
that Stanford escaped charges because King maintained dual citizenship
with the United States and Antigua and Barbuda, West Indies.6
This situation presents particular difficulty for businesses that operate
overseas because unpredictable application of the FCPA hinders
compliance with the law.7 The Stanford case could indicate relaxed FCPA
enforcement by the United States, or it could mean that the United States
interprets the FCPA's "foreign official" to mean a non-U.S. citizen.9
Although a business could operate under the assumption that the United
States interprets "foreign official" to include only non-U.S. citizens, the
business would do so at the risk of preparing an inadequate compliance
program and potentially violating the statute.io
When looking for a citizenship requirement, there is little tangible legal
guidance for businesses to follow." The FCPA specifically criminalizes
the bribery of "foreign officials," making it unlawful for a business and its
4. See Cassin, supra note 2 (recounting testimony that Stanford bribed Antiguan
bank regulators with a Swiss slush fund to keep his Ponzi scheme afloat).
5. See id.
6. See id. (conjecturing that the federal government withheld charges due, in part,
to the potential for costly appeals over the question of whether a "foreign official" is a
non-citizen when the "foreign official" had dual U.S. citizenship). The government
may also have been deterred from filing charges because Stanford already faced fraud
and conspiracy charges that carried lengthy prison terms. Id.
7. See Catherine Dunn, Compliance Hinges on the Tricky Definition of 'Foreign
Official,' LAW.COM (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp
?id=1202568942016&FCPA_Compliance Hinges on the TrickyDefinition of Fore
ignOfficial (noting the importance of clear statutory terms, which enable businesses to
create effective compliance programs and follow business practices that lead to fewer
violations).
8. See Cassin, supra note 2 (noting that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") chose
not to bring charges against Stanford in the face of clear indication of bribery).
9. See id (proposing that the DOJ withheld charges against Stanford because of a
lack of authority and case law supporting that a "foreign official" includes a U.S.
citizen).
10. See Dunn, supra note 7 (explaining that businesses need clarity to create
effective and comprehensive compliance programs); Dep't of Justice Criminal Div. &
SEC Enforcement Div., A Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DEP'T
OF JUSTICE (Nov. 14, 2012), at 71 http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa
/guide.pdf (stating that robust compliance programs help employees avoid FCPA
violations and help obtain non-prosecution agreements, or deferred prosecution
agreements from the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
potentially reducing fines and punishment for the business).
11. See Cassin, supra note 2 (noting the lack of precedent to suggest that the term
"foreign official" includes U.S. citizens and the uncertainty it created for the DOJ).
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agents to offer payment, promise to pay, or authorize the payment of
anything of value to any foreign official or foreign political party.12
Additionally, the payments must be made for purposes of influencing any
act or decision of the official or political party to obtain or retain business
of the payor.' 3  The statute defines "foreign official" as "any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof' without specifically defining "foreign" to mean a
non-U.S. citizen.14 While cases have analyzed the meaning of other aspects
of the statutory definition of "foreign official,"' courts have yet to decide
on the specific citizenship requirements of a "foreign official," leaving
businesses without a concrete answer as to what constitutes a FCPA
violation.1 6  These business are left with high-stakes guesswork as to
whether a court would decide that "foreign official" under the FCPA
implies that the actor be a non-U.S. citizen.17
This Comment argues that the FCPA contains a loophole that excludes
those with U.S. citizenship from being considered "foreign officials" to
protect the defendant from statutory ambiguity, but that businesses should
structure compliance programs to treat the term "foreign officials" as
including those with U.S. citizenship. Section I traces the evolution of the
United States' anti-bribery commitments. Section II analyzes courts'
divergent readings of the FCPA and the problem it creates in determining
whether "foreign" implies that the actor must be a non-U.S. citizen to
constitute a "foreign official." Section III identifies how a court could use
past approaches to interpret the term "foreign" to include actors with U.S.
citizenship, but ultimately concludes that courts should follow the rule of
lenity-a method of statutory interpretation that reads ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of defendants. It then argues that businesses should ignore
this interpretation for compliance program purposes. Finally, this
Comment places this issue in the context of the present debate over
whether to narrow the FCPA's terms, concluding that statutory clarity is
needed to better allow businesses to comply with the statute.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) ("It shall be unlawful ... [to] influenc[e] any act or
decision of [a] foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) induc[e] [a] foreign official
to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii)
secur[e] any improper advantage . . . .").
13. Id. ("[The payment must be made] to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person ... ").
14. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (interpreting the "instrumentality" prong of "foreign official").
16. See Cassin, supra note 2 (noting that a court has never faced an instance where
the "foreign official" in question had citizenship other than that of another country).
17. See Dunn, supra note 7 (describing the risks to businesses caused by ineffective
compliance programs).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES' ANTI-BRIBERY
OBLIGATIONS AND RECENT COURT DECISIONS THAT HAVE
INTERPRETED THE FCPA
This Section sets out the United States' domestic and international anti-
bribery obligations, and then reviews recent case law interpreting the FCPA
as a means to understanding the different possible ways to approach the
interpretation of "foreign."
A. The United States' Domestic Anti-Bribery Obligations
The United States enacted the FCPA in 1977 to combat bribery.' 8 The
FCPA does not cover all types of commercial bribery, but rather prohibits
the bribery of "foreign officials," foreign political parties, and candidates
for a foreign political party.' 9 Specifically, the FCPA defines "foreign
officials" to include officers and agents of a foreign government or that
government's agency, department, or instrumentality.
Substantively, the FCPA criminalizes active bribery as opposed to
passive bribery-meaning that it is illegal to give actively a bribe, but legal
to receive a bribe.2 0 The FCPA covers parties who issue certain classes of
securities, and it includes the issuer's "officer, director, employee, or
agent." 21 The FCPA prohibits a covered party, its employees, or agents
from offering, paying, promising to pay, or authorizing payment of money,
22gift, or anything of value to a "foreign official" or political party.
Additionally, successful prosecution under the FCPA requires a showing
that the bribes are intended to either influence an entity or induce an entity
to (1) use its influence to secure an improper advantage, (2) violate its
lawful duty, or (3) influence its decisions made in an official capacity.2 3
Over the years, the FCPA has evolved to meet various cultural and
international attitude shifts in determining what behavior is acceptable.24
18. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3-4 (1977) (Conf. Rep) (noting that the FCPA was
enacted to combat foreign bribery, partly in response to domestic and foreign bribery
incidents that exposed the U.S. companies engaging in widespread bribery, and partly
in response to a growing moral imperative to level the playing field in international
business by attacking bribery overseas).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(l)-(3).
20. See generally id § 78dd-1 (addressing the bribe giver, rather than the bribe
receiver who acts as a statutory element as the "foreign official").
21. Id. § 78dd-l(g)(1).
22. Id.
23. See id. § 78dd-1(a)(l)-(3).
24. See Eric J. Smith, Comment, Resolving Ambiguity in the FCPA Through
Compliance with the OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 27
MD. J. INT'L L. 377, 392-93 (2012) (explaining that amendments made to the FCPA
were in response to the United States' international obligations under the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development's Anti-Bribery Convention).
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Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 as a response to unethical corporate
behavior, particularly the SEC's Watergate-era investigations and
discovery of corporate slush funds used to bribe foreign government
officials for favorable business procurement.25 Congress deemed
criminalizing this behavior necessary to stopping the unethical conduct that
tarnished the image of American businesses abroad and to restore integrity
and public confidence to the American business system.26
Congress amended the FCPA twice since its enactment. 27  The 1988
amendment, part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, changed
the FCPA in two major ways.2 8  First, Congress altered the scienter
requirement for third-party bribes.29  Second, Congress clarified the
facilitation payments exception,30 while adding two more defenses
corporations could use to protect themselves against liability.3 1 Congress
intended these changes to lessen the obstacles on exports faced by U.S.
companies, while "attempting to balance a resolute opposition to global
corporate bribery with the promotion of U.S. economic interests abroad." 3 2
Congress next amended the FCPA in 1998 to comply with the United
States' obligations under the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development's ("OECD") Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign
25. See Pete J. Georgis, Comment, Settling with Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial
Intervention Is Needed to Curb an Expanding Interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 243, 248-49 (2012) (positing that the
FCPA was enacted in response to corporations' rampant unethical conduct as
discovered during the Watergate era's SEC and Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
investigations that uncovered corporate slush funds used to gain overseas business
agreements).
26. See id. at 250 (quoting then Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal)
("Many U.S. firms have taken a strong stand against paying foreign bribes and are still
able to compete in international trade. Unfortunately, the reputation and image of all
U.S. businessmen has been tarnished by the activities of a sizeable number, but by no
means a majority of American firms. A strong anti-bribery law is urgently needed to
bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the integrity of
the American business system.").
27. See Smith, supra note 24, at 383-85.
28. See Georgis, supra note 25, at 252-53 (explaining that the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act clarified and amended the 1977 terms to promote U.S. economic
interests abroad in the wake of a growing trade deficit).
29. See Smith, supra note 24, at 381 (acknowledging that the FCPA criminalizes
bribes only if the bribe giver has knowledge that the payments are made for bribing
purposes).
30. See Georgis, supra note 25, at 253-54 (noting that the FCPA clarified
facilitation payments to include " 'routine governmental action,' " like clerical duties).
31. See id. (noting that the Act permitted defenses of "reasonable and bona fide
expenditures," and "legality in the host country").
32. See id. at 254 (relaying the Act's reasoning, as stated in the congressional
findings, that corporations' concerns about the FCPA's scope should not eclipse the
FCPA's original intention).
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Public Officials in International Business Transactions and Related
Documents ("OECD Anti-Bribery Convention").33 In this amendment
Congress broadened the "foreign official" definition to include the
language "any person."3 4
B. The United States' International Anti-Bribery Obligations
In addition to its domestic obligations, the United States has become
party to international conventions that impose anti-bribery obligations. 35
As one of the first pieces of anti-bribery legislation, the FCPA stands as a
model for much of the subsequent international anti-bribery conventions,
with each convention reflecting different cultural norms and anti-bribery
goals.36
1. OECD Convention Combating Bribery ofForeign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions and Related Documents
The United States signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as part of
one of the first internationally binding efforts to combat bribery.3 7 The text
mirrors the FCPA and outlaws bribing foreign public officials. This
Convention does not include all countries, but rather the OECD member
33. See id at 254-55 (noting the United States' obligations to conform its domestic
legislation with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention's provisions, including broadening
"bribery," and the FCPA's jurisdictional scope).
34. See Smith, supra note 24, at 381 n.25 (explaining that the term "foreign
official" needed new language to clarify and conform with the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention's broader scope).
35. See Steps Taken to Implement and Enforce the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
- United States, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 2 (May 31, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyinintemationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention
/42103833.pdf [hereinafter OECD] (listing three international bribery conventions that
the United States has joined).
36. See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act-1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 98-100 (2010) (describing how the
United States has taken a leadership role in its domestic legislation and in leading
international efforts to combat bribery as a founding member of the OECD and as a
proponent of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention).
37. See OECD, supra note 35, at 1 (noting the United States' date of instrument
ratification and acceptance as December 8, 1998).
38. Compare id. (explaining that the FCPA is the United States' implementing
legislation), and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (outlawing the bribing of "foreign
officials"), with Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in
International Business Transactions and Related Documents, ORG. FOR ECON. Co-
OPERATION AND DEV. 7 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Convention] (requiring a member country to criminalize a person
who intentionally offers, promises, or gives any undue advantage to a "foreign public
official" in order to gain an improper business advantage through the action or inaction
of the "foreign public official").
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countries and any other countries that have joined the OECD Working
Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions ("Working
Group"). 39  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires its parties to
enact domestic legislation and monitors countries' compliance as its
enforcement mechanism. 4 0  Despite this seemingly relaxed enforcement
procedure, the Working Group brings the parties together and successfully
relies on the power of peer monitoring to ensure compliance with the
document's requirements. 4 1 Thus, the United States has a strong incentive
to comply with the document, especially because it is a founding member
of the OECD.4 2 Further, the Working Group reports on each country's
implementation of legislation, efforts to combat bribery of foreign public
officials, and compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.43
2. United Nations Convention Against Corruption
Additionally, the United States is party to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption ("U.N. Corruption Convention").44 This represents the
largest international effort to combat corruption.4 5 The text recognizes the
harm corruption causes to the growth of democracy, the rule of law, and
sustainable development of countries.46 The U.N. Corruption Convention
also deals with general forms of corruption, not limiting itself to business
corruption.47 As such, the U.N. Corruption Convention requires that parties
39. See OECD Convention, supra note 38, at 13, 19 (listing the member countries
of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and providing that non-member countries may
become parties by joining the Working Group).
40. See id. at 7, 11 (mandating that parties take measures to enact domestic
legislation and requiring that the parties monitor their success to ensure full
implementation).
41. See id at 18-19 (providing for monitoring and follow-up procedures that
include regular reviews, self-evaluation, and mutual evaluation and examination of
specific issues concerning bribery in international business).
42. See Smith, supra note 24, at 396 (discussing how acceptance between the
members and the recognition of a shared responsibility to combat bribery may have
elevated the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the level of customary international
law).
43. See OECD Convention, supra note 38, at 18-19 (requiring reports to
objectively assess countries' progress in implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention as a part of monitoring efforts). See generally OECD, supra note 35
(demonstrating an example of a country analysis report for the United States).
44. See OECD, supra note 35, at 2.
45. See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003,
T.I.A.S. No. 06-1129, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (providing the list of parties as one hundred
and sixty-one countries and the European Union).
46. See id. at 1, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 145.
47. See id at 3, 5, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 146, 148 (emphasizing that the purpose is to
prevent and fight corruption on a macro level and calling for preventative measures to
address corruption broadly).
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implement domestic measures in the areas of prevention, criminalization
48
and law enforcement, international cooperation, and asset recovery.
3. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
The United States has also signed the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption ("IACAN").49 IACAN was the first international
agreement to address corruption.50 The parties to IACAN are the member
countries of the Organization of American States.5 1 The agreement
requires that member states cooperate for the eradication of corruption in
the performance of public functions.52 To achieve these aims and ensure
compliance, IACAN calls for oversight mechanisms that rely on individual
monitoring assessment and member state support.
4. Agreement Establishing the Group of States Against Corruption
While not a member of the European Council, the United States signed
the Agreement Establishing the Group of States Against Corruption
("GRECO") in 1998.54 This group includes the European Council's
member states and observer states.55 The agreement covers methods of
strengthening the member countries' capacity to monitor and evaluate anti-
corruption measures.56 The agreement is enforced through follow-up
assessment and mutual evaluation to ensure compliance.57
48. See id. at 5-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 148.
49. See OECD, supra note 35, at 2.
50. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, March 29, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-39 (1998), at 1, 35 I.L.M. 724, 724 (1996) (noting the adoption
date as 1996 and the entry date as 1997).
51. See id at 3-5, 35 I.L.M. at 728-29 (defining the scope of the convention as
corruption that effects state parties).
52. See id. at 11, 35 I.L.M. at 732 (asking parties to provide mutual assistance to
carry out the recommendations and calling for member states to strengthen mechanisms
to prevent, detect, eradicate, and punish corruption).
53. See id. at 3-4, 35 I.L.M. at 728 (emphasizing the reliance on individual
monitoring and mutual support as the force used to ensure compliance, rather than the
creation of penalties under IACAN).
54. See OECD, supra note 35, at 2 (listing the United States as an observer state to
the Group of States Against Corruption and a signing party to GRECO).
55. See Comm. of Ministers, Resolution (98)7, COUNCIL OF EUR. (May 5, 1998)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/resolution(99)5_en.asp (listing
forty-seven member states, which include six observer states and the European
Council).
56. See id.
57. See id.
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C. The United States' Obligations in Practice and Recent Court
Decisions
In the past ten years, the U.S. government has increased its prosecution
of FCPA violations. This trend reflects a shift in enforcement priorities
that have changed as cultural norms have shifted both domestically, to
more actively enforce existing legislation, and internationally, to increase
anti-corruption efforts.59 However, while the global marketplace has
changed, the United States continues to affix antiquated terms to modern
business practices, which creates ambiguity in those terms' application to
changed business practices.60 The combination of increased prosecutions,
evolving business structures, and ambiguous terminology is reflected in
recent business case law.61
1. United States v. Kay
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicated that
bribing a government official to reduce sales taxes and customs duties for a
business entity could be illegal because it possibly falls within the
"obtaining and retaining business" language of the FCPA.62 In 2001, the
United States charged Douglas Murphy and David Kay, president and vice
president of American Rice, Inc., with FCPA violations after the company
made improper payments to Haitian officials to lower the company's sales
taxes and customs duties in Haiti. 6 3 In response, the defendants moved to
dismiss the charges against them, arguing that the United States failed to
state a claim because the payments fell outside the FCPA's scope.6 The
court considered whether the payments made to reduce taxes and duties fell
58. See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of
Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REv. 389, 389 (2010) (announcing 2009 as the
ultimate year of the FCPA's resurgence, emerging from a decade of enforcement after
having been rarely enforced).
59. See id. at 415 (analyzing the United States' increased enforcement as a product
of the need to keep pace with changing norms).
60. See id at 410 (arguing that the application of "foreign official" to state-owned
enterprises should be challenged in court for lack of judicial scrutiny).
61. See id. at 410-12 (listing enforcement actions that involve an issue with
"foreign official" and highlighting the rise of case law).
62. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 756 (5th Cir. 2004) (defining the scope
of the FCPA to include tax savings in the event that the bribe was intended to produce
an effect to aid in "obtaining or retaining business").
63. See id. at 740-42.
64. See United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting
that the defendants argued that the FCPA's plain language does not prohibit the
payments at issue, that the legislative history favors a narrow interpretation of the acts
the FCPA intends to prohibit, that the rule of lenity resolves ambiguities in favor of the
defendants, and that the FCPA does not give fair warning that the conduct at issue is
illegal).
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within the FCPA's requirement that payments made to "foreign officials"
must be for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.65 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss and found that, as a matter of law, payments
made to obtain favorable tax treatment are not payments to obtain or retain
business. 6 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue, reversed the
district court, and concluded that payments made to "foreign officials" to
evade unlawfully sales tax and customs duties fell within the FCPA's
scope.67 The court clarified that, to prove a FCPA violation, there must be
a showing of intent that unlawful payments directed to foreign officials to
reduce taxes and duties would actually improve the company's business.
2. United States v. Aguilar
In United States v. Aguilar, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California ruled that the term "instrumentality" under
"foreign official" could include an employee of a state-owned enterprise,
depending on the entity's characteristics. 69 The United States charged
Keith Lindsey, Steve Lee, and Lindsey Manufacturing Co. with FCPA
violations concerning payments made to a government-controlled electric
utility company.70 The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that
under the FCPA, an employee of a state-owned corporation cannot be
deemed a "foreign official."7 1 The court denied the motion and found the
electric utility company had attributes that made it an "instrumentality"
under the FCPA, making the employees that received the bribes "foreign
officials" for the purposes of a FCPA violation.72
65. See id (explaining the issue before the court as ruling on the defendant's
motion to dismiss).
66. See id at 686 (concluding that Congress considered and rejected language to
broaden the FCPA's scope to cover the conduct at issue and thus determined that the
indictment's allegations did not fall under the FCPA).
67. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 756 (finding that the conduct could fall within the scope
of the FCPA and that the case should not be dismissed because the conduct did not fall
outside the scope as a matter of law).
68. See id.
69. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(ruling that the term could include at least some state-owned enterprises and listing
characteristics that would tend to place an entity under the definition).
70. See id. at 1109-11 (alleging that the defendants paid high-ranking employees of
an electric utility company controlled by the Mexican government in order to gain an
unlawful business advantage).
71. See id. at 1110 (asserting that the government's wholly-owned subsidiary was
neither an "agency," "department," nor "instrumentality" of a foreign government).
72. See id at 1116-17 (concluding that not all government wholly-owned
subsidiaries are excluded from "instrumentality," and, after a fact-based examination,
dismissing the defendant's motion to dismiss).
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3. United States v. Carson
United States v. Carson held that "instrumentality" under "foreign
official" can include an employee of a state-owned enterprise.73 In the
case, the United States indicted three named defendants for charges of
FCPA violations concerning payments made to foreign, state-owned
companies on behalf of their employer, Controlled Components Inc., for
the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.74 The defendants moved to
dismiss the charges on grounds that the United States failed to state an
offense, arguing that employees of state-owned companies never constitute
"foreign officials" under the FCPA." The court denied the defendants'
motion and concluded after a statutory analysis that some business entities,
including state-owned companies, could, on a case-by-case basis, be
"foreign officials" under the "instrumentality" category.
II. THE DIVERGENT APPROACHES OF FCPA STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION CREATE PROBLEMS FOR COURTS ATTEMPTING
TO INTERPRET "FOREIGN"
This Section analyzes the previously presented obligations and case law
to demonstrate that prior instances of FCPA statutory interpretation fail to
produce an obvious result as to how a court would interpret the term
"foreign."
A. Prior FCPA Statutory Treatment Has Produced Differing
Interpretation Approaches for FCPA Terms and Leaves Uncertain
As to How a Court Would Interpret "Foreign"
This first Section analyzes the different modes of reasoning that courts
have used in past interpretations, showing there is no established way that a
court would interpret "foreign." To date, courts have interpreted "obtain
and retain business" and "foreign official" by reading the terms
73. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09 00077 JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (concluding that "instrumentality" could include some
business entities depending on the entity's nature and characteristics).
74. See id. at * 1-2 (indicting the defendants for nearly five million dollars worth of
bribes made on behalf of their employer, Controlled Components Inc., to various
foreign, state-owned companies).
75. See id. (contending that state-owned companies are never "departments,"
"agencies," or "instrumentalities" of a foreign government and therefore could not meet
the definition of "foreign official" under the FCPA).
76. See id at *3-6, *8 (employing an ordinary reading of the term and considering
the term in light of both the surrounding terms and the statute as a whole to reject the
defendant's assertion as impermissibly narrowing the FCPA and ultimately concluding
that the state-owned business could be an "instrumentality" on a fact-based analysis).
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expansively.77 In addition, courts have varied their modes of interpretation
when reading the same term.78 There are six approaches courts have used
to interpret the FCPA.
1. A Court Will Start with Plain Language Readings ofFCPA Terms
When interpreting a statute, a court will first look to the text for a
definition.79 If a term is not defined in the statute, the court will consider
the plain and unambiguous meaning of the language as controlling.80
Courts interpreting the FCPA start their inquiry with this mode of
interpretation. Generally, FCPA statutory language interpreted by a plain
language reading favors broad definitions.8 2
In Kay, the Fifth Circuit attempted to employ a statutory interpretation of
"obtaining or retaining business" by looking to the FCPA's language, but
found it provided little guidance. The FCPA fails to provide what
constitutes "business" under the statute's prohibition of bribes paid to
"obtaining or retaining business," and the court needed to articulate a scope
to rule on the case's issues. 84 Without a given statutory definition, the
court looked to the plain meaning of "obtaining or retaining business" for
guidance.8 5 In analyzing the parties' proposed dictionary definitions, the
court found that each party asserted different meanings to the term, making
the plain language reading debatable.86
Additionally in Aguilar, the court needed to interpret "instrumentality"
77. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REv. 489, 530-
32 (2011) (arguing that the terms under the FCPA are being reexamined and have been
enforced expansively, which has created problems).
78. See id. (citing instances where courts have approached "foreign official" in
different manners).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742-43 (5th Cir. 2004)
(commencing the statutory interpretation with plain language reading).
80. See, e.g., id. (explaining the mode of interpretation used when a statute fails to
provide a definition for a term).
81. See, e.g., id. (employing the plain language reading as the first step of its
interpretation of "obtaining or retaining business").
82. See, e.g., id. at 744 (refusing to determine conclusively the meaning of
"obtaining or retaining business" with just the plain language meaning).
83. See id. at 743 (analyzing the language "obtaining or retaining business" to see
if the language could encompass payments made to reduce taxes).
84. See id. at 743-44 (finding that the statute does not provide a defined scope of
"business," meaning the court needed to interpret "business" through other modes of
statutory interpretation to find whether the term encompassed bribes paid to custom
officials).
85. See id. at 744.
86. See id. (concluding that each proposed definition could apply plausibly to the
statute).
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in the statutory definition of "foreign official."8  The court noted that the
FCPA did not supply a definition, and as such, the court looked to see if a
plain language reading existed that would control the meaning. The court
adopted the defendant's definition, providing that an "instrumentality"
could never encompass a state-owned enterprise. 8 9 The adoption allowed
the court to avoid a full inquiry and recognize that the varying proposed
definitions would not provide an unambiguous definition and that
"instrumentality" would be better defined with the words surrounding it.9 0
Furthermore in Carson, the court started its interpretation of
"instrumentality" by giving the term its ordinary meaning, but determined
that plain meaning interpretation provided little help.91 The court used
dictionary definitions to gather both commonplace and legal definitions.92
To further its argument that state-owned enterprises are included under the
"instrumentality," the United States asserted a broad definition that the
defendants rejected. 93  The defendants asserted that the United States'
broad definition would render the proceeding terms in the statute
meaningless and further pushed the court to accept that there was no settled
legal definition of "instrumentality." 94
As the reviewed dictionary definitions did not provide an unambiguous
definition, the court accepted the defendant's argument and turned to other
means to determine the term's meaning.95
87. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp 2d 1108, 1113-14 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(addressing the defendant's claims that a wholly state-owned corporation could never
comprise a "foreign official" under "instrumentality").
88. See id. at 1113 (looking first at the statute's language to see if a given definition
could address the defendants' argument, then continuing to read the term according to
its plain meaning in the absence of a statutory definition).
89. See id at 1113-14 (acknowledging the varying definitions of such a broad
noun).
90. See id. (acknowledging that the definitions of "instrumentality" range from
acting as an agency or means for implementation, to a subsidiary branch through which
policies and functions are carried out).
91. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09 00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011).
92. See id. at *4 (using Black's Law Dictionary, Oxford English Dictionary, and
Webster's New Dictionary to gather a variety of definitions).
93. See id at *3-4 (explaining that the United States argued that state-owned
enterprises are included under either "agencies" or "instrumentalities" of the state as
opposed to the defendants, who argued that under the statute's given definition,
employees of state-owned companies can never be foreign officials).
94. See id at *5 (discussing the defendants' argument against adopting a narrow
reading that would render "agency" or "department" merely superfluous language in
the statute).
95. See id. (accepting the defendant's proposal to further consider the term in the
context of its preceding terms as opposed to accepting the United States' broad
interpretation without further inquiry).
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2. A Court Will Most Likely Read FCPA Terms Within the Context of
the Preceding Terms and in View of the FCPA As a Whole
After a plain language reading, a court may interpret the statutory
language in accordance with the statute's policy and objective and in a way
that each term within the statute has an operative effect. Overall, courts
interjected common sense and logic to establish terms' scopes when
reading the FCPA according to this principle, but resisted relying solely on
this method to establish a definitive meaning.
In Kay, the court looked to determine the scope of "obtain or retain
business" and found that "assist" suggested a broader scope of "obtain or
retain," but failed to concretely establish the actual scope.9 8 Additionally,
the court declared that the remainder of the statutory language did not
clearly suggest that the business nexus element should be construed
broadly or narrowly.99 Lastly, the court looked at the FCPA's title to find
that it suggested a broader interpretation. 00 Ultimately, the court found
arguments for both broad and narrow readings supported by other statutory
language and concluded that there was not a persuasive argument to
establish the phrase's scope.' 0
Additionally, in Carson, the court looked to interpret "instrumentality"
in the context of "agency" and "department," and within the FCPA as a
whole.10 2 The court first noted that "instrumentality" refers to an entity that
carries out governmental functions, but is also intended to capture entities
that are not "agencies" or "departments."10 3 In looking to interpret the term
as it would be in the vernacular, the court declared that "instrumentality"
96. See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004) (looking to
the FCPA's policy to determine the scope of "obtaining or retaining business").
97. See, e.g., Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *5 (employing a common logic-based
analysis to determine the meaning of "instrumentality").
98. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 744-45 (deciding that the scope of "obtain or retain
business" inconclusively lies somewhere between a broad interpretation and the
defendant's asserted narrow reading, potentially covering the actions described in the
case).
99. See id. at 745 (finding that the language in the "facilitating payments"
exception, and the section addressing the award of new business, both offered plausible
arguments for the United States and the defendants).
100. See id. (interpreting the title to suggest a broader reading of the terms, but
finding that it fails to establish concretely a broad reading with such a generic title).
101. See id. at 745-46 (concluding that the statute's language does not establish a
definite scope and could support a narrow or broad interpretation).
102. See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *5 (moving the statutory interpretation
beyond a plain language reading of "instrumentality" to consider it in conjunction with
its surrounding terms in the FCPA).
103. See id. (giving "instrumentality" the same generalized definition as the two
preceding terms, but ultimately differentiating its specific meaning).
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would function like an "agency" or "department" through which the
government conducts business without excluding a state-owned entity.1 04
Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's argument that
"instrumentality" should only consist of entities that share the same
characteristics as an "agency" and "department" because doing so would
narrow the FCPA when it was intended to attack broadly government
corruption.105
In Aguilar, the court used this principle to look at "department" and
"agency" to create a list of characteristics of an "instrumentality."l0 6
Although the defendants argued that "instrumentality" could only
encompass entities that shared characteristics of both "departments" and
"agencies," the court disagreed.10 7 The court dismissed this logic because
sharing the characteristics of the two proceeding terms would render
"instrumentality" surplus statutory language.1os Unlike Carson, which
looked to define "instrumentality" as capturing the entities not covered by
"agency" and "department," Aguilar pointed to some shared characteristics
that offer guidance as to what constitutes "instrumentality" and proposed a
guiding list of features.109
3. A Court Will Seldom Look to Other Statutes to Aid FCPA Term
Interpretation
When possible, a court may look to other statutes that contain the
disputed term as a means of interpretation.' 10 Courts interpreting the FCPA
104. See id at *5 (reasoning similarly to the court in McBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25, 51 (1931), where the court interpreted "vehicle" by asking what the word
evoked in the common mind).
105. See id at *5 (using the statutory intent to read "instrumentality" in light of the
FCPA as a whole).
106. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1114-15 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(responding to and accepting the defendant's argument that the court should look to
similarities between "agency" and "department" to define "instrumentality," as they are
entities that possess some shared characteristics).
107. See id at 1115 (finding a flaw in the defendant's logic by revealing that a state-
owned corporation will never be an "instrumentality" under the defendant's definition
because those entities do not always necessarily share the attributes of "agencies" and
"departments").
108. See id. (noting that if the term must share all of the other two term's
characteristics, it would rob "instrumentality" of its independent meaning and violate
the canon of construction that advises against reading terms to void them of meaning).
109. See id (providing a non-exclusive list of factors including: the entity provides a
service to the citizens, government officials appoint key officers or directors, the
government finances, at least in large, part the entity through funds through
governmental appropriations or revenue raising activities, the entity is granted and
exercises power to exercise its functions, and the entity is widely understood to perform
official functions).
110. See, e.g., Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *7 (offering the FSIA as an example
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hesitate to make direct comparisons between different statutes, but still
analyze parties' claims that employ this mode to glean congressional
intent.'" For example, the defendants in Carson argued that the court
should look to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's ("FSIA") definition
of "foreign official."1 l2 The defendants asserted that because the FSIA
deliberately included state-owned enterprises in its definition of
"instrumentality," Congress therefore did not intend to include state-owned
enterprises within "foreign official" when it failed to list it expressly under
the FCPA." 3  The court found little merit in that argument, limiting its
analysis to terms within the same statute."14 Rather, the court noted that
because Congress included state-owned enterprises under the FSIA's
definition a year before they passed the FCPA, Congress might have
intended to include state-owned enterprises under the FCPA."'
4. A Court May Employ the Charming Betsy Canon of Construction
to Aid in the Interpretation of the FCPA
Courts may employ other canons of construction to suggest a statutory
term's meaning in light of other legal doctrines, such as the Charming
Betsy canon of construction. The Charming Betsy'1 6 canon states that
statutes should not be construed to violate the law of nations or an
international agreement to which the United States is a party.1 Although
one court has used this method, it did so in an authoritatively and
conclusive manner, giving force to this method in future interpretations." 8
which defines "instrumentality" and presenting it as persuasive evidence).
111. See, e.g., id (refusing to apply the FSIA definitions to the FCPA definitions).
112. See id. (directing the court to the FSIA and asserting that Congress would have
included state-owned enterprises in the "instrumentality" definition if it had intended to
capture these entities under "foreign official").
113. See id (relying misguidedly on the canon of construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius-"the express mention of one thing excludes all others"-to compare
two different statutes instead of applying the canon of construction to one statute).
114. See id. (correcting the defendant's misguided argument by noting that the
canon only has force when the items are in an associated group as to allow for an
inference that excluded items were done so by choice).
115. See id.
116. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(requiring that, when possible, a United States statute should be construed so that its
interpretation does not violate international law or conflict with a United States
international agreement).
117. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(applying the Charming Betsy canon of construction and reasoning that if the United
States is to receive benefits of international obligations, it should honor its international
agreements).
118. See, e.g., id. at 1118 (applying definitively the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
to aid in the FCPA's interpretation).
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In Aguilar, the United States argued that "instrumentality" should be
read in light of the United States' treaty obligations that require the
criminalization of bribes to officials in state-owned enterprises.l 9 The
court found that Congress specifically amended the FCPA in 1998 to
implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and therefore accepted the
United States' argument that the FCPA should be read specifically to align
with that treaty.120 Moreover, because Congress amended only "foreign
official," the court saw the amendment as supporting the United States'
argument that "instrumentality" could include state-owned enterprises,
despite not having added "state-owned corporations" to the FCPA.121
Therefore, the court found that the FCPA should be construed according to
the United States' obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention. 12 2
5. A Court May Review the Legislative History to Aid in the
Interpretation of the FCPA
When interpreting statutory ambiguity, a court may consult the
legislative history to aid interpretation. 123 In FCPA interpretation cases,
courts have decided to consult and ignore legislative history to clarify
ambiguity. 12 4  Overall, courts have differed in applying this mode of
interpretation, but when using it, tend to employ it as a backdrop to
interpreting other terms.' 25  For example, the Aguilar court turned to
119. See id. at 1116-17 (reviewing the 1998 Amendments that changed the FCPA in
response to the United States' new obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention and arguing that the term should be read in light of that convention).
120. See id. (applying the Charming Betsy canon to the term "instrumentality" and
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention).
121. See id at 1117-18 (finding that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention reflects
that Congress viewed "foreign official" as already encompassing state-owned
corporations because Congress did not amend "instrumentality" or "foreign official" to
conform with the Convention's definition of "foreign public official," which included
broadly defined public enterprises).
122. See id. (reasoning, in part, that "instrumentality" could include state-owned
corporations under the United States' obligations to the OECD).
123. See id. at 1117 (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.,
633 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th Cir. 2011)) (permitting a review of the legislative history if
there is ambiguity in the language of the statute).
124. See id. (employing a legislative history review, but finding it unnecessary to
base the ruling on the review); United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (applying the legislative history to illuminate the term's scope). But
see United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2011) (declining to pursue further statutory inquiry by analyzing the
legislative history).
125. See, e.g., Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117, 1119 (deducing that the FCPA's
legislative history lacked sufficient weight to establish conclusively the term's
meaning).
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legislative history to determine if Congress had intended to include state-
owned corporations as an "instrumentality" under "foreign official."l 26
After weighing arguments over whether the term included or excluded
state-owned enterprises, the court concluded that the legislative history was
inconclusive.' 2 7 In response, the court circulated a hypothetical to the
parties, ultimately deeming from the answers that Congress would not have
viewed the specific case beyond the FCPA's reach just because the official
was a state-owned corporation.
In contrast to Aguilar, the court in Carson found it unnecessary to review
the legislative history to determine the definition of "instrumentality." 29
The court argued that a review of legislative history is only necessary when
the statutory language is ambiguous and within an incoherent statutory
scheme. 13 0 As the court had already determined that "instrumentality" was
unambiguous and within a consistent and coherent scheme, the court
declined to address the parties' legislative history arguments."'
In Kay, the district court looked to the legislative history to determine the
scope of "obtain or retain business."1 3 2 The court consulted the 1977,
1988, and 1998 committee reports.13 3 From this inquiry, the court found
that Congress declined to amend the "obtain or retain" language to broaden
the original definition's scope in both 1988 and 1998.134 As such, the 95th
Congress's intent controls when determining the language's scope.135 With
this in mind, the court determined that the payments made to reduce taxes
and customs duties fell outside of the scope of "obtain or retain business"
126. See id at 1117-18 (looking to the 1976 Senate bill, the 1977 House and Senate
bills, and the 1988 and 1998 amendments to help clarify the definition).
127. See id at 1119.
128. See id. at 1119-20 (proposing a hypothetical corporation and bribery incident,
asking each side to apply its arguments to the new set of facts, and ultimately
concluding that Congress would not have wanted to exclude the bribery from the
FCPA's scope on a language technicality).
129. See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *8.
130. See id (citing Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1885
(2011)).
131. See id. (declaring that previous determinations are sufficient for understanding
"instrumentality" without looking further to the legislative history).
132. See United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683-84 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(continuing the statutory inquiry with a review of the legislative history after failing to
concretely establish a definition by looking at the term's language).
133. See id. at 683-87 (listing the potential instances that Congress may have
considered the term's language and gathering reports from each time Congress wrote or
amended the FCPA).
134. See id at 685-87 (reasoning that by declining to amend the term, the later
Congresses accepted the 95th Congress's scope).
135. See id. at 686-87 (narrowing the range of pertinent legislative history to the
time when Congress actively debated the term).
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because Congress had rejected proposed bills that would have expressly
broadened the FCPA's prohibited activities.13 6
6. A Court May Consider Applying the Rule ofLenity
When addressing statutory ambiguity, the defendant may argue that the
court should apply the statutory construction, rule of lenity, to interpret the
term in favor of the defendant if doubts about the meaning remain.'37 A
court will interpret a term like this when the term's meaning proves so
questionable to protect defendants who could have fairly believed their
asserted definition.' 38 Generally, courts have resisted applying the rule of
lenity to the FCPA, as they had previously found its terms to have more
than one plausible definition.13 9 In Kay, the district court declined to apply
the rule of lenity because it determined that the statue was not
ambiguous.140 If there was no ambiguity, the court determined that there
was no reason to interpret the statute in the defendant's favor to avoid
unfairness.141 In Carson, the court declined to apply the rule of lenity
because it did not find that there were two equally plausible and applicable
definitions of the term "instrumentality." 42
B. Prior FCPA Statutory Treatment Fails to Produce an Obvious
Resolution as Applied to the Term "Foreign"
This Section applies the different modes of interpretation to the term
"foreign" to establish citizenship requirements. The FCPA is ambiguous
because the plain meaning of the word "foreign" conflicts with the
definition of the word "official," which broadly refers to "any officer or
employee. "43 A court could adopt the plain language meaning of
"foreign," narrowly construing the term to exclude U.S. citizens from
constituting "foreign officials" under the FCPA.144 Conversely, a court
136. See id at 684 (applying the legislative history to illuminate the term's scope).
137. See id. at 686-87.
138. See id. (explaining that the rule of lenity applies to protect a defendant from a
lack of fair warning of a term's meaning).
139. See id. at 686-87.
140. See id. (finding that the statutory scheme clearly allows for facilitation
payments).
141. See id. (resisting the rule's application because the defendant could fairly
interpret "obtain or retain business").
142. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (construing the rule of lenity narrowly to apply to
instances of true statutory ambiguity).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
144. See THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 439 (Compact ed.
2011) ("a person or thing from a foreign country"). A narrow reading of the definition
would interpret "foreign" as a person from another country, presumably excluding U.S.
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could broadly construe the term's definition to include U.S. citizens under
the word "any" provided in the statutory definition. 145 The use of court's
past interpretation methods to interpret other FCPA terms creates varying
results when applied to the interpretation of "foreign."
1. A Plain Language Reading Fails to Establish a Concrete Reading
of "Foreign"
In instances of statutory interpretation, a court starts its inquiry with a
term's plain and unambiguous statutory language. 14 6  As applied to
"foreign official," the FCPA defines the term "foreign official," but does
not provide a specific definition of "foreign" that references citizenship.14 7
Without a clear statutory definition, a court would give the term its
ordinary plain language reading, taking into consideration the statute's
policy objectives.1 4 8 In past FCPA interpretation cases, courts have used
both English language dictionaries and legal dictionaries to aid in the
interpretation. 149 Definitions drawn from some English language
dictionaries point to "foreign" as an adjective that describes a person or
thing that belongs to another country.150 Additionally, a review of major
legal dictionaries offers similar differing definitions. 5 ' Neither set clarifies
the definition, failing to establish concretely a coherent reading of
"foreign." 5 2
citizens.
145. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (focusing on "any officer or employee" to
interpret "foreign official" broadly).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004) (commencing
its interpretation inquiry by looking at the given language in the statute for a definition
or meaning).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (defining the term "foreign official" as "any
officer or employee of a foreign government," without definitively answering whether
the "foreign official," as a person, must be non-U.S. citizen).
148. Cf Kay, 359 F.3d at 742 (continuing the statutory interpretation by looking at
the plain language reading and taking into account the statute's policy objective in
response to the FCPA's failure to define the business nexus's scope).
149. See id. at 744 (citing Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary); United
States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Black's Law
Dictionary).
150. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 490 (11th ed. 2007)
(offering definitions ranging from "not being within the jurisdiction of a political unit"
and "situated outside a place or country" to "born in, belonging to, or characteristic of
some place or country other than the one under consideration").
151. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 719-20 (9th ed. 2009) ("of or relating to
another country"), with THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 439
(Compact ed. 2011) ("a person or thing from a foreign country"), and BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 223 (6th ed. 2010) ("belonging to another country or nation").
152. Cf Kay, 359 F.3d at 744-46.
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The plain language reading of the term "foreign" is ambiguous as used in
"foreign official."' A court would declare the term ambiguous because
the term can be read both expansively to include all people that meet the
required elements of the "foreign official" definition, and narrowly to
exclude those that meet the elements, but have U.S. citizenship.15 4
Additionally, after consulting the dictionary definitions under a plain
language reading, a court would find that the definitions fail to establish
concretely that a "foreign official" implies that the person must be a non-
U.S. citizen.'55 The varying definitions are similar to the definitions in
Kay, where the plausible definitions varied too much in scope to assign
definitively one to the term.15 6 As the court in Kay found an ambiguous
definition, a court would find that "foreign" is still ambiguous after a plain
language reading.' 5 7
2. "Foreign, " Read in the Context of the Proceeding Language and
the FCPA as a Whole, Does Not Conclusively Establish a
Definition of "Foreign"
A court would find that when looking to preceding terms and in view of
the FCPA as a whole, the readings offer arguments for both an expansive
and narrow view of "foreign. "'8 First, "foreign" must be read in
accordance with "official," much like the term "instrumentality" was read
according to "department" and "agency" in the Aguilar case.159  When
153. Cf Aguilar, 783 F. Supp at 1113-15 (establishing the plain language reading
was inconclusive for "foreign official"); Kay, 359 F.3d at 742 (finding the plain
language reading insufficient for "obtaining or retaining business").
154. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) ("any officer or employee" allows for a
broad interpretation); id. § 78dd-l(a)(l)(A)(i) ('foreign official" allows for a much
narrower interpretation) (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 490 (listing multiple
plausible definitions that can each alter the statutory meaning of "foreign" to either
"not being within the jurisdiction of a political unit" or "born in, belonging to, or
characteristic of some place or country other than the one under consideration").
156. Compare Kay, 359 F.3d at 744 (declaring the definition of "business" as a
volume of trade and the purchasing or sale of goods in order to make a profit as too
broad to assume a concrete definition), with BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 719-20 (9th
ed. 2009) ("of or relating to another country"), and BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 223
(6th ed. 2010) ("belonging to another country or nation").
157. Compare Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-17 (finding the definitions differed
to such an extent that the court adopted the defendant's definition for simplicity's sake
to further analyze it using other interpretive means), and Kay, 359 F.3d at 742, with
MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 490 ("not being within the jurisdiction
of a political unit"), and THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 439(Compact ed. 2011) ("a person or thing from a foreign country").
158. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 742 (continuing its statutory inquiry of "to obtain or retain
business" with the surrounding terms and in light of the FCPA's title and purpose).
159. Cf Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. at 1113-14 (reading "instrumentality" in light of the
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reading "foreign" in relation to "official," it can be interpreted as either the
person who is foreign or the position within the foreign government.16 0
Similarly, the term's definition as a whole supports either "foreign official"
as an individual or the person's official capacity.' 6' However, the statute's
description of prohibited conduct bolsters the assertion that the FCPA
references the job position, rather than the individual.162 Furthermore, the
statute's title lends support for an expansive reading of "foreign official" in
that the acts themselves are foreign, and not necessarily referring to the
bribery of a non-U.S. citizen.'63
Having established ambiguity, a court would read the term in light of the
statute as a whole and in the context of the preceding term.'1 When
reading within the definition's components, it refers to the "foreign
official's" position within the foreign government, rather than the person's
foreign nationality.16 5 Furthermore, the FCPA's title suggests the broad
nature of the statute and emphasizes the "Foreign Corrupt Practice," as
opposed to bribery of non-U.S. citizens. 16 6 However, these arguments are
less persuasive when a court looks to "foreign official"-the phrase that
generally connotes a person of non-U.S. citizenship.16 7 Therefore, a court
could not establish with certainty that particular term's definition and
would rather look to other canons of construction.16 8
two preceding words in the definition's series to find it supported both broad and
narrow definitions).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (defining the term as "foreign official" without
addressing the two words separately).
161. See id. (dictating that "foreign official" is "any officer or employee of a foreign
government").
162. See id § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)(i) (prohibiting "influencing any act or decision of
such foreign official in his official capacity").
163. See id § 78dd-1 (suggesting a broad reading from the title "Foreign Corrupt
Practices" as not referencing specific types of corruption, but rather broad forms).
164. E.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004) (progressing the
inquiry past a declared ambiguous term to read it in light of the other terms and FCPA
as a whole).
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (reading as "any officer or employee of a
foreign government," which suggests that the government position supersedes the
actual person).
166. See generally id. § 78dd-1.
167. Examining the possible natural meaning of "foreign" could aid in determining
the composition of "obtain or retain business." Cf Kay, 359 F.3d at 742-43.
168. Cf United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115-17 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(finding that the conflicting definitions and lack of support from other terms and the
FCPA could not conclusively establish a concrete meaning and leading the court to try
and interpret the meaning through other means).
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3. Other Statutes to Aid in the Interpretation of "Foreign" Fail to
Apply to "Foreign Official" and Persuasively Address Citizenship
Although the Carson court looked to the FSIA to aid in the interpretation
of "instrumentality," a court would be unable to apply the same logic to
"foreign official." Although the FSIA provides clear citizenship
requirements under "foreign state,"l 69 a court would not use "foreign state"
to interpret "foreign official" because the canon of construction that infers
meaning from statutory omissions does not apply to a term across two
different statutes.170 The court was reluctant in Carson to consider this
argument, and a court interpreting "foreign" would likely not find the FSIA
persuasive because the FSIA does not define "foreign official."l71
4. The Charming Betsy Canon of Construction Interprets "Foreign"
Expansively to Include Those with U.S. Citizenship
A court would also interpret "foreign" in light of the U.S. international
anti-bribery obligations.172 Aguilar used the canon of construction that the
term should be interpreted in light of U.S. international obligations, and a
court at first impression would also use that canon of construction. 73
Applying this canon to "foreign," an analysis in light of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention is persuasive that the term should be read expansively,
as was done in Aguilar.174  However, the OECD does not specifically
define any terms with reference to specific citizenships.'7 5 Analysis in light
of the U.N. Corruption Convention, the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption ("IACAC"), and GRECO are similarly persuasive.17 6
Specifically, the U.N. Corruption Convention calls for broad corruption
reduction efforts and would support the term to include U.S. citizens under
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012) (defining "foreign state" as an agency or
instrumentality without U.S. citizenship).
170. See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (correcting the defendant's logic that
the canon of construction applies to lists of terms within a single statute).
171. Cf id (declining to make inferences of congressional intent to purposefully
exclude a term from a list when comparing two statutes).
172. See id (applying the Charming Betsy cannon of construction to
"instrumentality").
173. See, e.g., id. (broadly reading "foreign official" to conform with the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, a U.S. international obligation).
174. Cf id. (reading the term to conform to the U.S. international obligations).
175. See OECD Convention, supra note 38, at 6-8 (urging countries to fight
corruption in a broad sense and take steps necessary to eradicate it).
176. See generally Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 50
(asking countries to strengthen all anti-corruption efforts); Comm. of Ministers, supra
note 55 (urging countries to strengthen all anti-corruption measures); United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, supra note 45 (urging countries to fight corruption at
all levels, recognizing the widespread harm that it causes).
2013 413
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA wREVIEW
"foreign official." A court would not likely consider these binding
authority, but rather persuasive texts when looking to the FCPA in light of
U.S. international obligations. 78
When applying the Charming Betsy canon of construction, a court would
likely find that under the United States' international obligations, a person
that meets the requirements of "foreign official" does not have to be a non-
U.S. citizen.'7 9  The international obligations focus less on the actual
nationalities and more on the destructive nature of bribery, suggesting the
term's interpretation should reduce the bribery where possible and not
exclude bribe receivers due to U.S. citizenship. 80 In the event that a court
does not apply the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, according to
Charming Betsy, a court should look at the other international
obligations.' The U.N. Bribery Convention would not likely allow this
loophole on citizenship as it would be adverse to the rule of law and
undermine the efforts to establish it.' 82 Congress has not amended the
FCPA since the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and it may not have
changed the FCPA after becoming party to the U.N. Bribery Convention
because it viewed terms as sufficient to enforce our international bribery
obligations. As such, the FCPA will be enforced as complying with the
U.N. Bribery Convention, meaning that "foreign" should be interpreted
broadly to encompass non-U.S. citizens.184
177. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 45, at 27-28,
2349 U.N.T.S at 146 (imploring countries to take action to fight corruption on all levels
and all types, presumably not supporting a citizenship exception).
178. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 50, at 8-10, 35
I.L.M 730-31 (asking countries to reduce corruption, while recognizing member state
sovereignty in implementing the Convention).
179. Cf Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (expanding "foreign official" under the
canon of construction to meet international obligations).
180. See generally OECD Convention, supra note 38 (taking a broad perspective on
corruption fighting); United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 45
(seeking corruption's eradication); Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
supra note 50 (recognizing corruption's destructive nature); Comm. of Ministers, supra
note 55 (strengthening measures to combat corruption).
181. See, e.g., Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (applying Charming Betsy to
interpret "instrumentality" in light of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention).
182. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 45, at 1-2,
2349 U.N.T.S. at 145 (stressing the establishment and strengthening of the rule of law
by eradicating the undermining efforts of corruption and bribery).
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (failing to provide a citizenship requirement after the
1998 Amendment updating "foreign official" to conform with the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention).
184. See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 45
(requiring parties to take all measures possible to eradicate corruption).
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5. A Review of the Legislative History Does Not Specifically Exclude
Those with U.S. Citizenship Under "Foreign"
A court would not find any significant additional means of interpretation
in the 1988 or 1998 amendments.' 85 A court would also not glean much
from the legislative history of the 1977 FCPA.'86  Congress wrote the
legislation to encompass foreign transactions, and in doing so, Congress
generally implied business in a foreign country.' 87 Additionally, the 1977
FCPA focused on what bribery did for the rule of law and democracy, not
the terms in general.'88 Therefore, Congress may not have used the word
"foreign" to address specifically non-U.S. citizens, but rather in an attempt
to focus on the general bribery of foreign governments and their employees
as a general category.189 Without specifically amending "foreign official"
to include a citizenship requirement, the legislative history does not
conclusively establish one reading.' 90
Additionally, a court could take the approach that Aguilar took in
deciding how Congress would have seen the facts in the instant case.191
The Aguilar court also looked at "foreign official," and as such, a court
would likely adopt the Aguilar court's approach and find that Congress
would not have wanted the bribe to escape punishment because of a
technicality in the language.19 2  This means that a court interpreting
"foreign" would similarly side with the Aguilar court and decide that when
the official is a person that would otherwise meet the definition of "foreign
official," it should not matter that the person has dual-citizenship. 93
185. See Georgis, supra note 25, at 252-55 (explaining that the amendments
addressed foreign public organization and facilitation payments).
186. See id. at 248-49 (noting that the 1977 FCPA debates focus strongly on
Congress's intent to pass the law in order to protect our reputation overseas in bribing
foreign governments).
187. See id at 249-50 (recognizing that Congress intended to address bribery in a
non-domestic sense)
188. See id at 250 (stressing the United States' reputation in the global economy
and seeing itself as a leader in promoting anti-corruption efforts globally).
189. See id. (looking to create the FCPA to address the issue of offering bribes
overseas to corruptly obtain business advantages).
190. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1108, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
(declining to use the legislative history in the term's analysis, as it was inconclusive on
whether or not Congress intended to include state-owned enterprises under "foreign
official").
191. See id. at 1116-19 (employing a congressional intent analysis after failing to
establish from the legislative history that "foreign official" included state-owned
enterprises).
192. Cf id at 1116-17 (illustrating the technicality that arises and gleaning that
Congress would avoid such an outcome).
193. Cf id. at 1119-20 (applying the court's proposed hypothetical to "foreign
official" to find that a common sense reading was appropriate to interpret
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When deciding whether to include the legislative history, a court would
decide to review the history like the courts in Aguilar and Kay.19 4 As such,
a court would likely review the legislative history, but not give much
weight to it.' 95  In applying a similar hypothetical to the one the court
proposed in Aguilar, a court would likely rule that Congress did not intend
a dual-citizenship technicality to prevent the prosecution of a bribe, if the
person was acting as an official of a foreign government. 96
6. An Application of the Rule ofLenity Construes "Foreign" in
Favor of the Defendant
The rule of lenity could compel a court to construe "foreign" in favor of
the defendant.'9 7 The rule of lenity considers that if there are two equally
plausible plain language readings of "foreign," a defendant might have
fairly assumed that "foreign" implied non-U.S. citizen and acted
accordingly.'98 A court might find that "foreign," after employing all other
available modes of interpretation, supports two divergent definitions and
leaves the court to guess as to what Congress intended.'" Despite having
never applied the rule of lenity to other FCPA terms, a court interpreting
"foreign" could find it necessary to employ the rule because the narrow and
broad readings are both equally plausible. 20 0 Therefore, the court could
construe "foreign" narrowly as the defendants assert.20'
"instrumentality").
194. See id. at 1116-17 (declining to apply a traditional legislative history
interpretation of "instrumentality"); United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th
Cir. 2004) (deciding that the term "obtain or retain" was ambiguous and the statutory
scheme incoherent regarding citizenship, therefore not looking to the legislative
history).
195. See id. at 1119-20 (declining to look at legislative history); accord Kay, 359
F.3d at 749-50 (dismissing a legislative analysis).
196. Cf Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17 (surmising that Congress would not
have meant for a language technicality to allow an instance of foreign bribery to go
unprosecuted).
197. See United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686-87 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(defining the rule of lenity as construing language in favor of the defendant in instances
where one must guess as to what Congress intended).
198. See id. (applying the rule of lenity only to instances when the term's meaning is
unclear or when the defendant does not have fair warning of its meaning).
199. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 719-20 (9th ed. 2009) ("of or relating to
another country"), with THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 439
(Compact ed. 2011) ("a person or thing from a foreign country"), and BARRON's LAW
DICTIONARY 223 (6th ed. 2010) ("belonging to another country or nation").
200. See generally supra Section II (arguing and demonstrating that multiple
interpretations of "foreign" are equally plausible to a defendant interpreting the FCPA
and acting according to its terms).
201. But cf United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701,
at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (construing the rule of lenity narrowly as applied to
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III. A COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF "FOREIGN OFFICIAL" WOULD
LIKELY CREATE A LOOPHOLE BY PROTECTING THE DEFENDANT
FROM STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, BUT BUSINESSES SHOULD
STRUCTURE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS THAT TREAT "FOREIGN
OFFICIALS" As INCLUDING THOSE WITH U.S. CITIZENSHIP
A court should read the term "foreign official" expansively to include
non-U.S. citizens, as the expansive reading reflects the FCPA's original
goal of eradicating foreign bribery and fulfills the United States'
international anti-bribery obligations.202 However, a court could also apply
the rule of lenity, creating a loophole and protecting defendants that bribe
those "foreign officials" with U.S. citizenship.203  Ultimately, when
creating compliance programs, businesses should reconcile the uncertainty
and consider "foreign official" to include those with U.S. citizenship to
protect against the FCPA's ambiguity.204
A court would likely first declare "foreign official" an ambiguous term
and employ a plain language reading and a subsequent reading in light of
the surrounding terms, finding that both readings fail to concretely establish
a definition due to plausible conflicting meanings.205 As such, a court
would continue its interpretation by consulting the terms of other statutes,
but would not persuasively establish a citizenship definition of "foreign
206
official" from the terms of the FSIA or any similar statutes. However, a
court reading the term in light of the legislative history and the United
States' international obligations would likely establish that "foreign
official" should not exclude U.S. citizens.207
Despite the reasons that a court should expansively read "foreign
official," a court could very well apply the rule of lenity, requiring it to rule
in favor of a defendant's argument for a narrow interpretation. 208 The rule's
"instrumentality" to apply only to instances of true statutory ambiguity).
202. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1108, 1116-17 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (applying Charming Betsy to interpret "instrumentality" and expand the term in
light of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention's broad notion of corruption).
203. See Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 686-87 (defining the rule of lenity as being
construed in favor of the defendant in instances where one must guess as to what
Congress intended, thereby protecting the defendant and its conduct).
204. See Dunn, supra note 7 (finding that language clarification would provide
greater confidence to bring violations of the FCPA in instances of foreign bribery,
thereby enabling better compliance programs).
205. See supra Section II.
206. See id.
207. See id
208. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at
*9-10 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (withholding from applying the rule of lenity as
applied to "instrumentality" because it was not an instance of true statutory ambiguity
with two plausible definitions).
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application could constrain a court from interpreting the FCPA to capture
the few cases that profit from language technicalities and lack of clear
definitions in the statute. 20 9  As such, this rule opens a loophole for
defendant businesses to engage in foreign bribery under protection of
statutory ambiguity and the rule of lenity.
This loophole creates difficulty for businesses when structuring
compliance programs for overseas operations. 210  Without actual
knowledge that a court would find both definitions of "foreign" equally
plausible and then apply the rule of lenity for the defendant's benefit,
businesses lack certainty that the "foreign official's" U.S. citizenship
protects its conduct from what otherwise would trigger a FCPA
violation.211 Additionally, a court could possibly withhold the rule of lenity
and expansively read the term, finding that the defendant business should
have understood that "foreign official" implied any person working in the
position's capacity.212  Without a definitive indication of what a court
would do, the loophole's temptation and uncertainty should be treated as
effectively nonexistent for purposes of structuring an effective compliance
program.
Further adding to the uncertainty, the DOJ and SEC continue to give no
indication of whether either agency would bring a FCPA violation, and if
so, how they would prosecute it in the event that a business engaged in
bribery with a "foreign official" that had U.S. citizenship.2 13 Although past
actions might indicate that the DOJ is unlikely to bring such a case,
businesses cannot safely create compliance programs assuming that the
DOJ and SEC have acquiesced to such behavior. 2 14 The recent DOJ and
SEC Prosecution Guide reflect the contrary, and suggest that the agencies
will continue to aggressively enforce the FCPA.215 This could very well
include prosecuting instances where the "foreign official" has U.S.
209. But cf United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1108, 1116-17 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
210. See Dunn, supra note 7 ("rHjaving the company and the enforcement agency
back home agreeing on what those two words mean can be the difference between
bribery and compliance.").
211. See id.
212. See generally Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 (finding that the defendant should
have understood instrumentality to encompass state-owned enterprises and therefore
not applying the rule of lenity).
213. See generally Dep't of Justice Crim. Div. & SEC Enforcement Div., supra note
10 (failing to address the citizenship of a "foreign official").
214. See generally Cassin, supra note 2 (discussing an instance where the DOJ may
not have pursued a FCPA violation where the "foreign official" had dual U.S.
citizenship).
215. See generally Dep't of Justice Crim. Div. & SEC Enforcement Div., supra note
10 (noting that the prosecutions would continue at the increased pace).
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citizenship, and to effectively avoid enforcement actions, businesses should
- 216advise against it in compliance programs.
The FCPA's continued uncertainty hinders business compliance
programs. Until Congress fixes the loophole by amending the statute to
include a definition of "foreign" to make it clear that "foreign official" may
include a person with U.S. citizenship, businesses lack the necessary clarity
they need to ensure compliance and should tailor their practices to err on
the side of caution.217
CONCLUSION
The FCPA prohibits bribes to "foreign officials," but it does not define
the word "foreign" or give guidance on what citizenship the official must
have. 2 18 Adding to the difficulty, the recent rise of prosecution and case
law fails to produce an obvious answer as to how a court would address the
issue and rule on the citizenship of a "foreign official." 2 19 This presents
challenges to businesses when creating effective compliance programs and
exposes business to the risks of FCPA violations and less favorable
deferred prosecution agreements.220 However, amidst the confusion, on
first impression a court would likely find that a person who meets all of the
elements of a "foreign official," but who has U.S. citizenship, would still
constitute a "foreign official," given recent court interpretations applied to
"foreign." Despite this, in light of the rule of lenity and its recent
applications, a court may be compelled to accept a defendant's argument
for a narrow reading of the term "foreign." 2 2 1 This creates a loophole that
further contributes to uncertainty and undermines the FCPA's goals.222
Never having reached a court, and lacking direct treatment from an
authoritative source, this ambiguity creates uncertainties for businesses
216. See Bixby, supra note 36, at 98 (noting how the reach of "foreign official" was
expanded to recognize the growth of state-owned enterprises).
217. See Dunn, supra note 7 (advocating for statutory language clarification to better
create compliance programs).
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (defining "foreign official" without mention of
a citizenship requirement).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL
5101701, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (interpreting "instrumentality," relying
heavily on a language reading of the term).
220. See Dunn, supra note 7 (detailing the relationship between favorable treatment
from the government in prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements for
comprehensive compliance programs).
221. But cf United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686-87 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(defining the rule of lenity as being construed in favor of the defendant in instances
where one must speculate on congressional intent).
222. See generally Dunn, supra note 7 (asserting that the ambiguity can lead to
unintentional violations and encourage intentional violations).
2013 419
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA wREVIEW
223
conducting operations overseas. The issue is indicative of the growing
debate in the United States over expanding the FCPA to include a more
modem notion of anti-corruption in commercial transactions and reigning
in the FCPA's expansion to return the legislation to its original narrow
focus.224 However, in the midst of this debate, the statute's terms do not
reflect the modem realities of a global market place, creating situations that
the original statute did not consider.22 5 Until statutory reform directly
addresses the ambiguity, businesses should err on the side of caution and
operate with compliance programs that treat "foreign officials" as including
those that meet the FCPA's elements and have U.S. citizenship.
223. See id. (arguing for the term's clarification to ensure more predictable
enforcement actions).
224. See Westbrook, supra note 77 (comparing the FCPA to the UK Anti-Bribery
Act and arguing that the FCPA could expand to include all commercial bribery).
225. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 58, at 410 (arguing that the application of
"foreign official" to state-owned enterprises should be challenged in court for lack of
judicial scrutiny).
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